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GENDER INEQUALITY IN IMMIGRATION 
LAW: WHY A PARENT’S GENDER SHOULD 
NOT DETERMINE A CHILD’S CITIZENSHIP 
ALEXANDRA STRUZZIERI† 
INTRODUCTION 
“There are ‘two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth 
and naturalization.’ ”1  Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, individuals born in the United States 
are citizens by birth.2  Individuals born outside the United States 
can become citizens if they are naturalized within the United 
States.3  However, some individuals born outside the United 
States are automatically citizens at birth, by virtue of the 
citizenship of the individual’s parents.4  This is called derivative 
citizenship.5  To confer derivative citizenship to a child born 
abroad, the citizen parents must have been physically present in 
the United States for a certain period of time.6  For unwed 
parents, the process of conferring citizenship becomes more 
complex.7  In that context, whether or not a child born abroad is 
considered a citizen is determined largely by the gender of the 
United States citizen parent. 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s 
University School of Law. 
1 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wong 
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898)). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born . . . in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
3 Id. (“All persons . . . naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012). 
5 Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Unlike 
citizenship by naturalization, derivative citizenship exists as of a child’s birth or not 
at all.”). 
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c). 
7 See id. §§ 1401, 1409(c). 
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Consider the following hypotheticals as an illustration.  X 
was born outside the United States, but was brought to the 
United States a few days after his birth by his father, a United 
States citizen.  X was raised by his father in the United States. 
Years later, X is convicted of various crimes and is subjected to a 
deportation proceeding.  X wishes to assert as a defense to the 
deportation that he is a citizen by birth because of the derivative 
citizenship his father conferred to him.  However, because X’s 
father only lived in the United States for nine years prior to X’s 
birth, he does not meet the ten-year physical presence 
requirement imposed on fathers in order to confer citizenship on 
a child.  Therefore, X is not considered a citizen and is deported. 
Next, consider Y.  Y was also born outside the United States, 
but unlike X, Y lives abroad for most of his life.  Y eventually 
moves to the United States and shortly thereafter is convicted of 
various crimes and subjected to a deportation proceeding.  Y 
asserts the defense of derivative citizenship and is successful. 
This is because Y’s mother, a United States citizen, lived in the 
United States for one year when she was a child, although she 
never lived in the United States again after that.  Because there 
is a one-year physical presence requirement imposed on mothers, 
as opposed to ten years imposed on fathers, Y is considered a 
citizen by birth.  Therefore, Y is a citizen and is not deported. 
Both scenarios illustrate that an individual’s derivative 
citizenship is based on the gender of that individual’s citizen 
parent.  For example, in the first hypothetical, if X’s mother, 
instead of his father, were the United States citizen, X would 
have been considered a citizen.  Similarly, in the second 
hypothetical, if Y’s father, instead of his mother, were the United 
States citizen, Y would not have been considered a citizen. 
Although X and Y may not be the most sympathetic defendants, 
there is an inherent inequality in the law that governs their 
citizenship.  The law takes two similarly situated groups, 
(1) unwed citizen mothers of a child born abroad and (2) unwed
citizen fathers of a child born abroad, and makes durational
distinctions based on the gender of that parent.  Thus, the effect
of the law is to favor the citizenship of a child whose mother is a
United States citizen, even if she had only lived in the United
States for one year, over the citizenship of a child whose father is
a United States citizen, even if he resided there for a much
longer duration.
2016] GENDER INEQUALITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW 1147 
The specific statutory provisions illustrated above are 
modeled after §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”).8  The INA imposes a ten-year 
durational requirement on an unwed citizen father of which five 
of those years must be obtained after the father is fourteen years 
old, but imposes a one-year durational requirement on an unwed 
mother, without any limitation on when that one year occurred.9  
This Note analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence with regard to gender-based distinctions in the 
INA as well as the current circuit split over the constitutionality 
of §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a).  This Note concludes that the 
distinctions in §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a) impermissibly 
discriminate on the basis of gender and, therefore, violate the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. 
Part I provides a background of equal protection principles, 
including the well-established standard the Supreme Court uses 
in analyzing gender discrimination claims.  Part I also illustrates 
Supreme Court precedent by discussing three important cases 
dealing with gender discrimination in the INA.  Part II presents 
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) and describes the current split of
authority among the circuit courts over the constitutionality of
those provisions.  Part III details why the gender-based
distinctions in the INA are unconstitutional and proposes a
gender-neutral solution to remedy the constitutional violation.
8 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) (1952). Unless otherwise noted, 
“[§§] 1401(a)(7)” and “[§] 1409(c)” refer to the provisions of the 1952 Act. 
9 Section 1401(a)(7) states: 
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at 
birth: . . . a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States 
and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the 
other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, 
was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a 
period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which 
were after attaining the age of fourteen years. 
Id. § 1401(a)(7). Section 1409(c) provides the physical presence requirement for 
citizen mothers: 
Notwithstanding [Section 1409(a)(7)], a person born, on or after the 
effective date of this chapter, outside the United States and out of wedlock 
shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, 
if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such 
person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in 
the United States or one of its outlying possession for a continuous period 
of one year. 
Id. § 1409(c). 
1148 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1145  
I. GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
A. Equal Protection Principles and Standards of Review
When a federal law is challenged for discriminating or
creating classifications based on gender, that law is subject to a 
heightened, or intermediate, form of review10 to determine 
whether it violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection.11  Under this standard of review, the government 
must show that the “classification serves ‘important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.’ ”12  The justification for the classification “must be 
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to 
litigation.”13  Further, the justification “must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, 
or preferences of males and females.”14 
Since the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court has 
struck down many laws on equal protection grounds,15 and has 
only held that gender discrimination was permissible in a few 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1994); Miss. Univ. 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
11 Claims against the federal government alleging a violation of equal protection 
are brought under the Fifth Amendment. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
contains an explicit mention of equal protection, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee 
of equal protection is implicit in its Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an 
equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously 
discriminating between individuals or groups.”). Equal protection claims brought 
against the federal government are analyzed the same way as equal protection 
claims brought against state governments are analyzed. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal 
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
12 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 
U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
13 Id. 
14 Id.; see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718; see generally Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
15 See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733 (finding a violation 
of equal protection where a male was denied admission to an all-female nursing 
school); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (finding Oklahoma’s statute, which 
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the 
age of 18, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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circumstances.16  Specifically, when gender based distinctions are 
present in immigration laws, the Court has been reluctant to find 
violations of equal protection.17  Because immigration statutes 
are traditionally reviewed under a lower, deferential form of 
scrutiny,18 the Court is faced with the dilemma of deciding 
whether to review the law under this lower form of scrutiny or to 
review the law under intermediate review.19  
B. Gender Discrimination in Immigration Statutes and the
Court’s Jurisprudence
1. Deferring to Congress’s Broad Immigration Powers To
Justify a Gender Based Distinction
For the first time in Fiallo v. Bell,20 the Supreme Court was
presented with an equal protection challenge to an immigration 
policy that contained a gender-based classification for deciding 
whether or not to grant “special preference immigration status” 
to aliens who qualified as “children” or “parents” of United States 
16 The Court has upheld gender discrimination when the classification is based 
on biological differences. See generally Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael 
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
17 See Nguyen, 553 U.S. at 73; Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998);
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799−800 (1977). 
18 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 94, 101 
n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power over aliens is of a political character and therefore is
subject only to narrow judicial review” and “the federal power over aliens is ‘quite
broad, almost plenary,’ and therefore the classification need[] only a rational basis.”
(quoting Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 1971)).
19 There are stark differences in reviewing a statute under rational basis as 
opposed to reviewing a statute under intermediate scrutiny. First, the burden is 
placed on different parties. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]nder heightened scrutiny, ‘[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it 
rests entirely on [the party defending the classification].’ Under rational basis 
scrutiny, by contrast, the defender of the classification ‘has no obligation to produce 
evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.’ ” (first quoting 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; then quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). 
Another difference is the scope of the judicial inquiry into the statute’s purpose. Id. 
at 76–77 (“[Under heightened scrutiny,] the court must inquire into the actual 
purposes of the discrimination, [while under rational basis review, a court may] 
hypothesize interests that might support legislative distinctions.”). A third 
significant difference is the fit between the means used and the ends served. Id. at 
77 (“Under heightened scrutiny, the discriminatory means must be ‘substantially 
related’ to an actual and important governmental interest. Under rational basis 
scrutiny, the means need only be ‘rationally related’ to a conceivable and legitimate 
state end.”). 
20 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
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citizens.21  Because of the way “child” was defined in the 
statute,22 all American citizens were entitled to bring their alien 
children to the United States, except fathers of illegitimate 
children.23  Similarly, all citizens were entitled to bring their 
alien parents to the United States, except for those citizens who 
were illegitimate children desiring to bring their fathers.24  The 
appellants, three sets of unwed fathers and their illegitimate 
children, had sought a special immigration preference either as 
an alien father or alien child by virtue of their relationship with 
the citizen or resident child or parent.25  They were each denied 
this preference.26  The appellants sought an injunction against 
enforcement of the statutory provision and challenged the 
provision for violations of equal protection and due process.27 
The Court denied the appellants’ challenge and refused to 
review the statute with a higher form of scrutiny.28  The Court 
explained that past cases “have long recognized the power to 
expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely 
immune from judicial control.”29  The Court instead applied a 
21 Id. at 788. 
22 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1970). “Child” is defined in part as “an unmarried 
person under twenty-one years of age who is . . . an illegitimate child, by, through 
whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the 
relationship of the child to its natural mother.” Id. (emphasis added). 
23 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 790 (majority opinion). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 791. More specifically, the appellants argued: 
[T]he statutory provisions (i) denied them equal protection by
discriminating against natural fathers and their illegitimate children “on
the basis of the father’s marital status, the illegitimacy of the child and the
sex of the parent without either compelling or rational justification”;
(ii) denied them due process of law to the extent that there was established
“an unwarranted conclusive presumption of the absence of strong
psychological and economic ties between natural fathers and their children
born out of wedlock and not legitimated”; and (iii) “seriously burden[ed] and
infringe[d] upon the rights of natural fathers and their children, born out of
wedlock and not legitimated, to mutual association, to privacy, to establish
a home, to raise natural children, and to be raised by the natural father.”
Id. (quoting Brief for Appellants at 11–12, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), No. 75-
6297, 1976 WL 181349). 
28 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795. 
29 Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). 
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“facially legitimate and bona fide” standard30 and deferred to 
Congress’ judgment in enacting the statute, stating that “[t]his 
distinction is just one of many drawn by Congress pursuant to its 
determination to provide some but not all families with relief 
from various immigration restrictions.”31  The Court reasoned 
that since these distinctions were “policy questions entrusted 
exclusively to the political branches of our Government,” the 
Court had “no judicial authority to substitute [its] political 
judgment for that of Congress.”32  The Court therefore upheld the 
challenged provisions under this deferential form of review.33 
2. Using Biological Differences To Justify a Gender-Based
Distinction
More than two decades later, in Miller v. Albright, a
fractured Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1409(a)(4) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, which required an unwed 
citizen father to establish paternity of his child before the child’s 
eighteenth birthday in order to confer citizenship on that child.34  
The law did not impose any similar affirmative steps to be taken 
by the mother in order to establish a relationship with the child 
and thus, was challenged for impermissibly discriminating on the 
30 Id. at 794–95 (stating that when legislative immigration power is exercised 
“on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither 
look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification 
against [the interest asserted by the challenging party]”). 
31 Id. at 797. The Court then described the other distinctions Congress created 
in the statute for determining whether the alien can qualify for preferential status. 
See id. at 797–98 (“Congress has decided that children, whether legitimate or not, 
cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or are over 21 years of 
age.”); id. at 798 (“Legitimated children are ineligible for preferential status unless 
their legitimation occurred prior to their 18th birthday and at a time when they 
were in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents.”); id. (“Adopted 
children are not entitled to preferential status unless they were adopted before the 
age of 14 and have thereafter lived in the custody of their adopting or adopted 
parents for at least two years.”); id. (“[S]tepchildren cannot qualify unless they were 
under 18 at the time of the marriage creating the stepchild relationship.”). 
32 Id. at 798. 
33 Id. at 799–800. 
34 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424–26 (1998); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) 
(1988). The precise question to be decided by the Court was “whether the 
requirement in § 1409(a)(4)—that children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but 
not citizen mothers, obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through 
legitimation, written acknowledgement by the father under oath, or adjudication by 
a competent court—violates the Fifth Amendment.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 432. 
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basis of gender.35  The plurality opinion, written by Justice 
Stevens, was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.36  Justice 
Stevens explained that the three government interests 
advanced—“[E]nsuring reliable proof of a biological relationship 
between the potential citizen and its citizen 
parent . . . encouraging the development of a healthy relationship 
between the citizen parent and the child while the child is a 
minor[,] and the related interest in fostering ties between the 
foreign-born child and the United States”—were all important 
and the means provided by the statutory provision were “well 
tailored to serve those interests.”37  Further, Justice Stevens 
opined that § 1409(a)(4) was not based on a stereotypical gender-
based classification and that the biological differences between 
men and women “provide a relevant basis for differing rules for 
governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born [out 
of wedlock].”38  Therefore, unlike in Fiallo, where the Court 
upheld the statute under a rationality review, here, the Court 
upheld the statute under a more heightened scrutiny, examining 
the interests and the means, but ultimately concluding that it 
was constitutional.39 
Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice 
Kennedy joined, concluding that the petitioner did not have 
standing to raise her father’s gender discrimination claim.40  
Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion in which Justice 
Thomas joined, explaining that the Court had “no power to 
provide the relief requested” by the petitioner because of 
Congress’s broad immigration power.41  Two separate dissents 
were filed, one by Justice Ginsburg in which Justices Souter and 
Breyer joined,42 and another by Justice Breyer in which Justices 
Ginsburg and Souter joined.43  Justice Ginsburg would have 
struck down the provision for impermissibly discriminating 
based on gender stereotypes.44  Justice Breyer would have 
35 Miller, 523 U.S. at 426. 
36 See id. at 423–45. 
37 Id. at 436, 438, 440. 
38 Id. at 444–45. 
39 Id. at 437–45. 
40 See id. at 445–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
41 See id. at 452–59 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
42 See id. at 460–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
43 See id. at 471–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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similarly found gender discrimination after applying heightened 
scrutiny.45  This scattered plurality opinion left open the 
questions of whether § 1409(a)(4) violated equal protection 
principles and which form of scrutiny should be applied to such 
provision. 
Recognizing the conflict between the circuit courts since the 
Miller decision,46 only three years later, in Nguyen v. INS, the 
Supreme Court again was faced with deciding the 
constitutionality of § 1409(a)(4).47  In a five to four split, the 
Court concluded that § 1409(a)(4) did not violate the guarantee of 
equal protection.48  The majority opinion, led by Justice Kennedy, 
classified this distinction as gender based and applied heightened 
scrutiny.49  The Court held that both governmental interests 
asserted: 
[A]ssuring that a biological parent-child relationship
exists . . . [and] ensur[ing] that the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not
just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the
law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide
a connection between child and citizen parent, and, in turn, the
United States[,]50
were important, and that the means chosen to further those 
interests were substantially related to the end.51 
45 Id. at 477–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
46 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2001) (recognizing that “[s]ince Miller, the 
Courts of Appeal have divided over the constitutionality of § 1409” and therefore 
“granted certiorari to resolve the conflict”). 
47 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2012). The statute required that the father satisfy 
one of three options before the child’s eighteenth birthday in order for the child to 
obtain citizenship: (1) “the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s 
residence or domicile”; (2) “the father acknowledges paternity of the person in 
writing under oath, or”; (3) “the paternity of the person is established by 
adjudication of a competent court.” Id. 
48 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58–59. 
49 Id. at 60–61. The Court applied heightened scrutiny, but did not categorically 
declare that gender discrimination in immigration statutes must be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny. The Court simply analyzed the statute under heighted scrutiny 
first, and after finding that it survived, concluded that it must necessarily survive 
rational basis review, the lowest standard, as well. Id. at 61 (“[W]e conclude that 
§ 1409 satisfies [heightened scrutiny]. Given that determination, we need not decide
whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates
Congress’[s] immigration and naturalization power.”).
50 Id. at 62, 64–65. 
51 Id. at 70. 
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As to the first interest, assuring that a biological parent-
child relationship exists, the Court explained that mothers and 
fathers are not similarly situated in this respect, because the 
mother’s relation to the child is “verifiable from the birth itself,” 
while the father “need not be present at the birth,” and his 
presence “is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood.”52  The 
Court noted that “the use of gender specific terms takes into 
account a biological difference between the parents,”53 which in 
its past decisions has been a permissible basis for distinctions 
based on gender.54 
As to the second interest, the Court explained that “the 
opportunity for a meaningful relationship between [a] citizen 
[mother]” and a child born abroad “inheres in the very event of 
birth,” whereas the opportunity does not always exist for the 
father because “it is not always certain that the father will know 
that the child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even the 
mother will be sure of the father’s identity.”55  The Court went on 
to state, “[w]ithout an initial point of contact with the child by a 
father who knows the child is his own, there is no opportunity for 
father and child to begin a relationship.”56  The Court concluded 
its equal protection analysis by stating that the means employed 
were “ ‘substantially related to the achievement of’ the 
governmental objective[s] in question”57 without giving much 
further explanation to how the means were substantially related. 
The Court explained that given the determination that 
§ 1409(a)(4) passed heightened scrutiny, it “need not decide
whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the
statute implicates Congress’[s] immigration and naturalization
power.”58
Justice O’Connor dissented, criticizing the Court’s failed 
attempt at heightened scrutiny review.59  She noted the 
majority’s failure to inquire into the actual purpose of 
52 Id. at 62–63. 
53 Id. at 64. 
54 See generally Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
55 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65. 
56 Id. at 66. 
57 Id. at 70 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
58 Id. at 60–61. 
59 Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“While the Court invokes heightened 
scrutiny, the manner in which it explains and applies this standard is stranger to 
our precedents.”). 
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§ 1409(a)(4), and stated that the majority instead “hypothesize[d]
about the interests served by the statute.”60  Justice O’Connor
further explained that the “gravest defect” in the majority’s
reliance on the government’s asserted interests was the
“insufficiency of the fit between § 1409(a)(4)’s discriminatory
means and the asserted end.”61  She also opined that the
existence of comparable sex-neutral alternatives has provided a
reason to reject a gender-based classification and that the statute
appeared to perpetuate a stereotype about fathers and their
relationship with their children.62  All of this combined,
supported her dissenting argument that the majority failed to
properly scrutinize § 1409(a)(4).
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
§§ 1401(A)(7) AND 1409(C)
A. The Challenged Statutory Provisions
The constitutionality of §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) of the INA
is the subject of the current split of authority between the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United 
States v. Flores-Villar,63 and the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Morales-Santana v. Lynch.64  In both cases, the petitioners claim 
that the INA provisions, which impose different physical 
presence requirements for conferring derivative citizenship on a 
child based on a parent’s gender, constitute violations of equal 
protection.65  Section 1401(a)(7) states: 
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United 
States at birth: . . . a person born outside the geographical 
limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of 
parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the 
60 Id. at 78. 
61 Id. at 80. 
62 Id. at 82, 88–89. 
63 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
64 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015). 
65 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523–24; Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 993. 
Morales-Santana was born in 1962 and thus challenges the 1952 version of the INA, 
whereas Flores-Villar was born in 1974 and thus challenges the 1970 edition of the 
INA. See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524 (“The law in effect at the time of birth 
governs whether a child obtained derivative citizenship as of his or her birth.”). The 
current statute provides for a physical presence term of five years for unwed citizen 
fathers, two of which are attained after the age of fourteen, and a term of one year 
for unwed citizen mothers. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(c) (2012). 
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United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was 
physically present in the United States or its outlying 
possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten 
years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of 
fourteen years.66 
The statute, at first glance, appears to apply equally to all 
parents, whether male or female.  However, an exception to this 
durational requirement is provided in § 1409(c) for unwed citizen 
mothers: 
Notwithstanding [§ 1409(a)(7)], a person born, on or after the 
effective date of this chapter, outside the United States and out 
of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the 
nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the 
nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s 
birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present 
in the United States or one of its outlying possession for a 
continuous period of one year.67 
Thus, the effect of the statute is to impose a one-year physical 
presence requirement on the mother if she was a United States 
citizen, and a ten-year requirement on the father if he was the 
United States citizen, in order to confer derivative citizenship to 
the child.  Presented with the exact same constitutional question, 
the Ninth and Second Circuits arrived at different conclusions.68 
B. The Ninth Circuit Finds No Violation of Equal Protection
In United States v. Flores-Villar, the appellant, Ruben
Flores-Villar, was born in Mexico to a sixteen-year-old United 
States citizen father and a non-United States citizen mother.69  
Flores-Villar was brought to San Diego when he was two months 
old and was subsequently raised there by his father and 
grandmother.70  After being convicted of a number of crimes and 
being removed from the United States on several occasions, 
Flores-Villar was charged with being a deported alien found in 
66 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). The versions of the INA provisions discussed in 
this note, 1952 and 1970, are identical. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) 
(1970), with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) (1952). 
67 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952). 
68 See discussion infra Sections II.B–C. 
69 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d per 
curiam, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (4-4 decision). 
70 Id. 
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the United States after deportation.71  He moved to present 
evidence that he was a United States citizen by way of derivative 
citizenship from his father.72  The district court denied the 
motion and convicted Flores-Villar.73  He appealed his conviction 
and challenged §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) on the grounds that the 
provisions constituted violations of equal protection.74 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
relied almost exclusively on the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Nguyen v. INS, which held that § 1409(a)(4) of the 
INA, requiring unwed citizen fathers, but not unwed citizen 
mothers, to legitimize the child in order to confer citizenship on 
that child, was constitutional.75  The court considered the 
government’s first interest—assuring a link between the unwed 
citizen father and the United States, to the child76—and 
analogized it to the interest advanced in Nguyen.77  The court 
reasoned that although the means employed by the provision in 
Nguyen and the provision in this case are different, “the 
government’s interests are no less important, and the particular 
means no less substantially related to those objectives, than in 
Nguyen.”78  The court quoted the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Nguyen:  “Unlike an unwed mother, there is no assurance that 
the father and his biological child will ever meet, or have the 
kind of contact from which there is a chance for a meaningful 
relationship to develop.”79  However, the court gave no 
explanation as to why the means were no less important, nor did 
it address how the physical presence requirement at issue here 
was substantially related to the government’s interest in 
assuring a link between the father, the United States, and the 
child,80 or how the distinction between mothers and fathers was 
justified by this interest. 
71 Id. Flores-Villar was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 994–95. 
75 Id. at 995–98. 
76 Id. at 995–96. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 996. 
79 Id. at 995. 
80 The Court briefly states, “[t]he residence differential . . . furthers the objective 
of developing a tie between the child, his or her father, and this country.” Id. at 997. 
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The Ninth Circuit then addressed the next asserted 
interest—avoiding statelessness.81  Quoting a prior opinion, the 
court stated, “[o]ne obvious rational basis for a more lenient 
policy towards illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers is 
that illegitimate children are more likely to be ‘stateless’ at 
birth.”82  In explaining how the means substantially relate to the 
end, the court simply stated, “[t]he residence differential is 
directly related to statelessness; the one-year period applicable to 
unwed citizen mothers seeks to insure that the child will have a 
nationality at birth.”83  Finding that the statute withstood 
heightened scrutiny, the court held that §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) 
did not violate equal protection.84 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in a 4-4 split without publishing an 
opinion.85  Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration of the 
case.86  However, since a 4-4 split does not establish a 
precedent,87 lower courts are free to choose whether to follow the 
decision reached in Flores-Villar.88 
C. The Second Circuit Finds a Violation of Equal Protection
Recently, in Morales-Santana v. Lynch, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decided the constitutionality of the same 
provisions of the INA that were challenged in Flores-Villar, but 
came to the opposite result.89  The petitioner, Morales-Santana, 
was born in the Dominican Republic to a Dominican mother and 
a United States citizen father.90  His father, who was born in 
81 Id. at 997; see Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 531 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“[A] child born out of wedlock abroad may be stateless if he is born inside a country 
that does not confer citizenship based on place of birth and neither of the child’s 
parents conferred derivative citizenship on him.”). 
82 Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 996. 
83 Id. at 997. 
84 Id. 
85 564 U.S. 210 (2011). 
86 Id. 
87 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (“[T]he lack of an 
agreement by a majority of the Court on principles of law involved prevents it from 
being an authoritative determination for other cases.”). 
88 Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Morales-Santana case, 
and will hear oral arguments on November 9, 2016. Regardless of the Court’s 
decision, Section III.B asserts that there should be a new, gender-neutral provision, 
which would better serve the purposes of the statute. 
89 Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2015). 
90 Id. at 524. 
2016] GENDER INEQUALITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW 1159 
Puerto Rico and obtained United States citizenship pursuant to 
the Jones Act,91 resided in Puerto Rico until twenty days before 
his nineteenth birthday.92  In 2000, Morales-Santana was 
subjected to removal proceedings after being convicted of various 
felonies.93  After his application for withholding of removal based 
on derivative citizenship was denied, Morales-Santana filed a 
motion to reopen based on a violation of equal protection.94  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion, and the Second 
Circuit was asked to review the Board’s decision.95 
At the outset, the court declared that it would apply 
“heightened scrutiny” to the law because it discriminates based 
on gender.96  The court rejected the government’s request to 
review the provision under rational basis like in Fiallo, 
distinguishing the rights at issue.97  In Fiallo, Congress’s 
“ ‘exceptionally broad power’ to admit or remove non-citizens” 
was implicated, while here, the issue is a claim of “pre-existing 
citizenship at birth,” which does not implicate Congress’s power 
to admit or remove non-citizens.98 
The court then closely examined the importance of each 
interest, reflective of true heightened scrutiny review.99  The 
Government asserted two interests in support of the statute’s 
gender-based distinction: (1) ensuring a sufficient connection 
between the child and the United States, and (2) preventing 
statelessness.100  The court recognized the first interest as 
important, however, it pointed out the Government’s failure to 
justify the provision’s differential treatment of mothers and 
91 See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012) (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after April 
11, 1899 . . . are declared to be citizens of the United States.”). 
92 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524. If Morales-Santana’s father stayed in 
Puerto Rico past his nineteenth birthday, Morales-Santana would have been able to 
claim derivative citizenship through him. See § 1401(a)(7) (stating that a person can 
claim derivative citizenship if that person was “born outside the . . . United 
States . . . of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United 
States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United 
States or its outlying possessions for a period or period totaling not less than ten 
years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years”). 
93 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524. 
94 Id. at 524–25. 
95 Id. at 523. 
96 Id. at 528. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)). 
99 Id. at 530–35. 
100 Id. at 530–31. 
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fathers.101  The court found that there was no reason that unwed 
fathers would need more time in the United States than unwed 
mothers would need to ensure a connection to the United 
States.102  Therefore, it concluded that “the statute’s gender-
based distinction is not substantially related to the goal of 
ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen children and the 
United States.”103  The court addressed the fact that its decision 
conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Flores-Villar and 
stated, “The Ninth Circuit provided no explanation for its 
conclusion, and the Government provides none here.”104 
The court then turned to the Government’s second asserted 
interest, preventing statelessness, and again agreed that the 
interest was important.105  However, the court found that 
preventing statelessness was not Congress’s actual purpose in 
establishing the physical presence requirements of the INA, and 
further that, even if it was, the gender-based distinctions in the 
statute were not substantially related to preventing 
statelessness.106  The court noted that the availability of gender-
neutral alternatives persuaded it in its finding that the means 
were not substantially related to the ends, and ultimately, that 
the statutory provisions could not survive intermediate 
scrutiny.107 
101 Id. at 530 (“[The Government] offers no reason, and we see no reason, that 
unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to 
their child’s birth in order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure 
are passed on to citizen children born abroad.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 531. 
104 Id. at 530. 
105 Id. at 531. Preventing statelessness is a well-established and important 
governmental interest. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160–61 
(1963). 
106 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531; see also id. at 532–33 (“Neither the 
congressional hearings nor the relevant congressional reports concerning the 1940 
Act contain any reference to the problem of statelessness for children born abroad. 
The congressional hearings concerning the 1952 Act are similarly silent about 
statelessness as a driving concern.”); id. at 533 n.10 (“Although [a Senate Report 
dated January 29, 1952] reflects congressional awareness of statelessness as a 
problem, it does not purport to justify the gender-based distinctions in the physical 
presence provisions at issue in this appeal.”). 
107 Id. at 535. The Court noted prior case law indicating that the availability of 
gender-neutral alternatives meant that the statute could not survive intermediate 
scrutiny. See id. at 534; Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) 
(invalidating a gender-based classification where a gender-neutral approach would 
serve the needs of both classes); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282–83 (1979) (“A gender-
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The court concluded by describing the remedy to be 
administered after a finding that the statutory provisions were 
unconstitutional.108  It noted that “binding 
precedent . . . caution[ed] [the court] to extend rather than 
contract benefits in the face of ambiguous congressional intent”109 
and, therefore, severed the ten-year requirement, requiring every 
unwed citizen parent to satisfy the one-year requirement 
instead.110  The effect of this severance confirmed Morales-
Santana’s citizenship as of his birth.111 
III. DIFFERENT PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNWED
MOTHERS AND FATHERS IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ACT VIOLATES BASIC EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND 
SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A GENDER-NEUTRAL PROVISION 
A. Intermediate Scrutiny Should Be Applied in Reviewing
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) of the INA
The first problem that arises in analyzing the
constitutionality of the gender-based derivative citizenship 
provisions of the INA is that there is still no established United 
States Supreme Court precedent for the level of scrutiny to be 
used.112  Although the Miller court analyzed the provision at 
issue under intermediate scrutiny, it only issued a plurality 
decision and thus no precedent was established.113  Similarly, 
although the Nguyen Court decided the constitutionality of the 
based classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates 
additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal 
protection scrutiny.”). 
108 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 535–37. 
109 Id. at 537 (“Indeed, we are unaware of a single case in which the Supreme 
Court has contracted, rather than extended, benefits when curing an equal 
protection violation through severance.”). 
110 Id. at 535–36. 
111 Id. at 538. 
112 Similarly to the Nguyen court, the Flores-Villar court decided the 
constitutionality under intermediate scrutiny, but does not categorically decide that 
intermediate scrutiny is the form of review that should apply. See United States v. 
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Accordingly, we conclude that even 
if intermediate scrutiny applies, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409 survive . . . [and 
§§] 1401(a)(7) and 1409 satisfy rational basis review as well.”); Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 61 (2001) (“Given [the] determination [that the statute withstands
heightened scrutiny], we need not decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny
pertains . . . .”).
113 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423 (1998). 
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statute under intermediate scrutiny, it did not categorically 
declare intermediate scrutiny to be the applicable standard.114  
Instead, the Court explained that since the statute passed the 
intermediate form of scrutiny, it would necessarily pass a lower 
form of scrutiny.115 
Despite this lack of precedent, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) 
should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.  First, it is 
important to note that these provisions do not implicate 
“Congress’s ‘exceptionally broad power’ to admit or remove non-
citizens,” like the provisions in Fiallo did.116  Instead, 
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) would confirm an individual’s “pre-
existing citizenship” and thus would not involve any questions of
admission or removal of noncitizens.117  Thus, the review of
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) are not governed by the deferential
standard of review in Fiallo.118  Second, all gender-based
classifications are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.119  The
provisions at issue explicitly make the physical presence
requirement for an unwed citizen mother one year, and make the
requirement for an unwed citizen father ten years.120  Therefore,
because this classification is made on the basis of gender, it is
subject to intermediate review.121  The government must show
that the physical presence requirements serve “important
114 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61; supra note 58 and accompanying text. Because 
the court found that the statute did not pass intermediate scrutiny, it follows that 
the statute would not survive a lower form of scrutiny, therefore, the court did not 
need to decide which form of scrutiny applied, as the statute would fail both. 
115 Id. at 60–61 (explaining that given the determination that § 1409(a)(4) 
passed heightened scrutiny, it “need not decide whether some lesser degree of 
scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates Congress’[s] immigration and 
naturalization power”). 
116 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 
(1977)). The provision at issue in Fiallo granted special preference immigration 
status to aliens who qualified as “children” or “parents” of United States citizens. See 
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788. 
117 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528; see also Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123 
F. Supp. 3d 870, 881–82 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (“Petitioner claims that under a
constitutional interpretation of the challenged statutes, he is a citizen as of the date
of his birth. He is not challenging the denial of an application for immigration status
or any other government action that could be said to implicate the congressional
‘power to admit or exclude foreigners’ at issue in Fiallo.”).
118 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528. 
119 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1994). 
120 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) (2012). 
121 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 533. 
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governmental objectives” and that those requirements are 
“substantially related to the achievement of [the important 
governmental] objectives.”122 
The physical presence requirements of §§ 1401(a)(7) and 
1409(c) do not survive intermediate review because the 
requirements are not substantially related to the government’s 
asserted interests: (1) ensuring a sufficient connection between 
the child born abroad and the United States, and (2) preventing 
statelessness.123  Although the prevention of statelessness has 
been recognized as an important governmental interest,124 this 
interest does not justify the different physical presence 
requirements. 125  Statelessness is defined as a lack of any 
nationality.126  A child born out of wedlock is stateless when, for 
example, the child is born in “a country that does not confer 
citizenship based on place of birth and neither of the child’s 
parents conferred derivative citizenship” on that child.127  While 
the one-year requirement imposed on unwed citizen mothers may 
further the interest of preventing statelessness when the child is 
born to an unwed citizen mother, it does not further the interest 
of preventing statelessness when the child is born to an unwed 
citizen father.  This durational requirement for unwed mothers is 
premised on the idea that “children of unwed citizen mothers 
fac[e] a greater risk of statelessness than the children of unwed 
citizen fathers.”128  However, there is no support for this view.129  
122 Id. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982)). 
123 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 527–28; United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 
F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).
124 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160–61 (1963); Morales-
Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
125 The court in Morales-Santana discredits the prevention of statelessness as 
the purpose of the statute. 804 F.3d at 531–34. However, a Senate Report dated 
January 29, 1952 mentions statelessness. See id. at 533 n.10 (“This provision 
establishing the child’s nationality as that of the . . . mother regardless of 
legitimation or establishment of paternity is new. It [e]nsures that the child shall 
have a nationality at birth.”). Thus, since there is some evidence that preventing 
statelessness may have been a purpose in enacting § 1409(c), this Note does not 
discredit that purpose, but instead, shows why the different physical presence 
requirements do not substantially further that purpose. 
126 The UN Refugee Agency, Ending Statelessness, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr. 
org/en-us/stateless-people.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
127 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
128 Id. at 533. 
129 Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars on Statelessness in Support of Petitioner at 
28, United States v. Flores Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 2010 
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In fact, the opposite appears to be true.  Notably, a large number 
of countries do not confer citizenship on a child born to an unwed 
mother, leaving the child stateless if the United States citizen 
father cannot meet the ten-year durational requirement imposed 
by the statute.130  To apply the one-year durational requirement 
only to United States citizen mothers does not remedy the 
problem of statelessness and, therefore, is not substantially 
related to that interest. 
Similarly, the government’s asserted interest in ensuring a 
sufficient connection between the child born abroad and the 
United States is not substantially furthered by the different 
physical presence requirements.  Like the prevention of 
statelessness, it is clear that this interest is also important.131  
However, there is no justification for imposing a longer physical 
presence requirement on the father.  If the government believes 
that a child’s father must reside in the United States for ten 
years to ensure a connection between the child and the United 
States, how does it follow that a mother only needs to reside for 
one year in order to ensure this same connection?132  There is 
simply “no reason[] that unwed fathers need more time than 
unwed mothers in the United States prior to their child’s birth in 
order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure 
are passed on to citizen children born abroad.”133 
Further, the government’s justification in support of the 
different physical presence requirements is misplaced.  In both 
circuit cases, the government relied on Nguyen in arguing that 
the longer durational requirement imposed on unwed citizen 
fathers is justified by biological differences between males and 
females.134  The government explained that while the opportunity 
for a connection with the United States “inheres in the very event 
of birth” for the child of an unwed citizen mother, the same 
WL 2569160 (“There is no support for the . . . assertion that the risk of statelessness 
for non-marital children of U.S. mothers was or is much higher than for U.S. fathers 
of non-marital children born abroad, or indeed any higher at all.”). 
130 Id. at 23–28. 
131 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 530 (“As both parties agree, [the] interest [of 
ensuring a sufficient connection between the child and the United States] is 
important.”). 
132 Not to mention, this single year of residency could have occurred when the 
mother was one year old. 
133 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 530. 
134 Id.; Brief for United States at 21, United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 U.S. 990 
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 2010 WL 3392008. 
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opportunity does not exist for a child of an unwed citizen father, 
because there is no assurance that the father will even know 
about his child.135  Under these circumstances, the government 
explained there would be no opportunity for a connection 
between the father and child and, in turn, the United States.136  
But this argument is irrelevant to the provisions at issue.  Here, 
the father has already taken the affirmative step of legitimizing 
the child as required by the previous provisions of the statute.137  
Because of this, the child knows of both the father and the 
mother.  The opportunity for a relationship to develop with the 
parent and, in turn, the United States, is equally present. 
Therefore, to impose a longer physical presence requirement on 
the father does not further the interest of assuring a connection 
between the child and the United States. 
Finally, the availability of gender-neutral alternatives is 
generally fatal to intermediate scrutiny analysis.138  With regard 
to §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c), there have been at least two 
instances in which gender-neutral legislation has been proposed, 
but both times these proposals have not been incorporated into 
the INA.139  One example dates as far back as 1933, in a letter 
written by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.140  
Secretary Hull proposed a gender-neutral alternative to the INA 
provisions suggesting that a child born out of wedlock abroad to 
an American parent who has resided in the United States be a 
citizen by birth if there is “no other legal parent under the law of 
the place of birth.”141  Also in 1933, a bill was presented to 
135 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001). 
136 Id. 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2012). These provisions requiring an unwed father to 
prove paternity were held to be constitutional in Nguyen. The statute required that 
the father satisfy one of three options before the child’s eighteenth birthday in order 
for the child to obtain citizenship: (1) “the person is legitimated under the law of the 
person’s residence or domicile”; (2) “the father acknowledges paternity of the person 
in writing under oath, or”; (3) “the paternity of the person is established by 
adjudication of a competent court.” Id. 
138 See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); see also 
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 534. 
139 See Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 3d 870, 887 (W.D. Tex. 2015) 
(“In the lead-up to what would become the 1934 Act, Congress was twice presented 
with gender-neutral bills that would have addressed the problem of statelessness 
with respect to mothers as well as fathers.”). 
140 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 534. 
141 Id. 
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Congress providing for citizenship of a child born abroad if that 
child’s “father or mother is at the time of the birth of such child a 
citizen of the United States.”142  Because of this availability of 
gender-neutral alternatives as well as the failure of the physical 
presence requirements to substantially further the government’s 
interests, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) fail intermediate scrutiny 
review and therefore are unconstitutional. 
B. A Gender-Neutral Solution
While the Morales-Santana court reached the right
conclusion of unconstitutionality, the remedy provided by the 
court was insufficient.  The Morales-Santana court severed the 
ten-year physical presence requirement and left the one-year 
requirement to apply to all unwed parents.143  Although this 
remedy is consistent with equal protection principles, it is not 
sufficient to serve the purposes of the statute.  Instead, Congress 
should create a new, gender-neutral statute that would effectuate 
both the prevention of statelessness and the assurance of a 
sufficient connection between the child and the United States. 
The current statute, as amended in 1986, provides for a 
physical presence term of five years for unwed citizen fathers, 
two of which are attained after the age of fourteen, and a term of 
one year for unwed citizen mothers.144  Thus, the gender-based 
142 American Citizenship Rights of Women: Hearing on S. 992, S. 2760, S. 3968 
and S. 4169 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Immigration, 72nd Cong. 2 
(1933). 
143 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 535–36. The remedial options of the courts 
are limited by the severance provisions in the statute. Id. at 536 (alteration in 
original) (“The 1952 Act contains a severance clause that provides: ‘If any particular 
provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this Act . . . shall not be affected thereby.’ ”). Thus, courts 
can only do so much to remedy the problem of gender discrimination. Id. (“The 
clause makes clear that only one of the provisions in § 1409, rather than both, 
should be severed.”). 
144 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012) states: 
The following shall be nationals and citizens at birth: . . . a person born 
outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying 
possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of 
the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically 
present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or 
periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after 
attaining the age of fourteen years. 
While U.S.C. § 1409(c) still states: 
Notwithstanding [8 U.S.C. § 1406(g),] a person born . . . outside the United 
States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the 
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distinctions are still present in the statute today.  The first part 
of the gender-neutral solution would be to impose the five-year 
term on any unwed citizen parent, regardless of gender.  There is 
no exact formula for how long a parent must live in the United 
States in order to assimilate the values of the United States and 
therefore promote a connection between the child and the United 
States.  However, a term of five years is a reasonable amount of 
time.  It is a compromise between the onerous ten-year 
requirement imposed by the 1952 Act and the lax one-year 
requirement resulting from the Morales-Santana decision.  A 
five-year term is also consistent with the physical presence 
requirement for naturalization, which requires a person seeking 
citizenship to live in the United States for five years prior to their 
application.145 
Although the five-year physical presence requirement would 
substantially further the government’s interest in assuring a 
connection between the child and the United States, it would not 
adequately address the problem of statelessness.  For example, 
the problem of statelessness would still persist if the United 
States citizen parent does not meet the five-year requirement, 
and the child is born in a country that does not recognize 
citizenship by place of birth.  This concern can be alleviated by 
creating an exception that would apply only if the citizen parent 
did not meet the five-year physical presence requirement and 
there was no other way to confer citizenship of another country 
on the child.  In that case, the exception would provide for a one-
year physical presence requirement on the United States citizen 
parent in order to confer derivative citizenship to the child. 
Although a one-year term may be insufficient to ensure a 
connection between the child and the United States, it would 
apply only in the limited circumstance just described, and thus 
would not pose too much of a threat to that interest. 
nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the 
United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had 
previously been physically present in the United States or one of its 
outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. 
See supra note 65. 
145 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(3) (2016) (“[T]o be eligible for naturalization, an alien 
must establish that he or she . . . [h]as resided continuously within the United 
States . . . for a period of at least five years after having been lawfully admitted for 
residence.”). 
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In sum, the proposed statute would appear as follows: 
(1) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth: . . . a person born outside the United States and
its outlying possessions to parents one of whom is an alien, and
the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of
such person, was physically present in the United States or its
outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less
than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the
age of fourteen years.
(2) Notwithstanding section (1), a person born outside the
United States and out of wedlock to a United States citizen
parent shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality of
that parent if the parent had previously been physically present
in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a
continuous period of one year, and no other citizenship of such
child can be attained in any other manner.
Thus, this general five-year requirement and the one-year 
exception would adequately serve both interests of ensuring a 
sufficient connection between the child and the United States 
and preventing statelessness. 
CONCLUSION 
Recall the hypothetical in the Introduction of this Note. 
Under the new proposed statute, X would be a citizen of the 
United States regardless of his citizen parent’s gender.  Under 
the general rule, Y would not be a citizen of the United States, 
unless there was no other way to confer citizenship on him.  If 
that were the case, then Y would be a citizen based on the one-
year residency of his parent, regardless of that parent’s gender. 
As this Note discussed, laws such as §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) of 
the INA cannot withstand equal protection analysis because they 
impermissibly discriminate based on gender.  If the United 
States wishes to grant citizenship to a certain class of citizens, it 
must do so without gender distinctions, absent an important 
interest that is substantially furthered by the distinction. 
Because preventing statelessness and ensuring a connection 
between a child born abroad and the United States are not 
substantially furthered by the gender based distinctions in the 
INA, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) are unconstitutional and should 
be remedied by a gender-neutral statute. 
